So to what extent should changes in credit be attributed to demand or supply shifts? How does one tell whether a credit drought is caused by supply factors related to changes in bank behavior (e.g. changes in credit risk perception due to increased level of uncertainty) or deterioration of bank balance sheets? To resolve these questions, we estimate a Bayesian vector autoregressive (VAR) model comprising GDP, GDP deflator, loans to non-financial corporation (NFCs), interest rate on loans, and monetary stance variable (money stock) for the period prior to 2008Q4. Given its problematic nature, we discuss our choice of monetary policy stance variable in detail and compare the model results using alternative monetary policy stance variables. Sign restrictions are imposed on impulse response functions to identify structural innovations that might be considered loan supply or monetary stance shocks. Structural innovations are estimated with historical decomposition of lending trends into cumulated loan supply, monetary stance, and unidentified shocks. These are interpreted for both in-sample and out-of-sample periods. The obtained results suggest that lending trends were subject to negative loan supply shocks of unprecedented magnitude from the start of 2009. Exceptionally cautious bank behavior remained in place until the end of the reviewed period (i.e. 2010Q1). The effect stemming from monetary policy stance shocks was mainly expansionary before the crisis and contractionary afterwards. We also observe large expansionary monetary innovations in the end of the reviewed period. Our results appear to justify the use of a monetary stimulus to boost the loan supply and show that lending trends in the period were to a large extent determined by the changes in the behavior of the banks in the altered macroeconomic environment.
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The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides the general description of the Russian banking sector, analyzing the relevant aspects CBR monetary policy in recent years. Section 3 presents the formal model and discusses the choice of variables. Section 4 presents the empirical evidence and discusses policy implications. Section 5 concludes.
2
Recent trends in the Russian banking sector
The expanded role of intermediation in Russian banking is rather new. Before the 1998 financial crisis, Russian banks were mostly involved in speculation in foreign exchange and government debt markets or acting as treasuries for their parent corporations. Channeling resources to the real sector was of minor significance. During the 2000s, Russian banking moved increasingly into traditional retail banking roles, particularly loan provision. Although the Russian banking sector remains small in terms of net assets to GDP when compared to other emerging economies (Fungáčová and Solanko, 2009a) , credit flows to the real sector have increased rapidly in recent years and become an important determinant of cash flows in the economy. The rapid growth of deposits resulting in part from a heavily managed exchange rate regime and CBR forex purchases have provided banks with a rich resource for lending. Similar conditions have been seen in Asian economies with similar monetary policy regimes (Mohanty and Turner, 2010) . Russia turned to the fiscal mechanism of the sovereign wealth fund to absorb foreign currency from central bank interventions. This approach proved insufficient to prevent rapid money stock growth in the face of an expansion in government spending and large capital inflows that triggered additional forex purchases. Moreover, the amount of foreign currency earnings diverted into sovereign wealth funds was linked by design solely to oil price fluctuations. (Fungáčová and Solanko, 2009b) . As the world financial crisis unfolded, Russia found it increasingly difficult to tap foreign funding sources that had been major channels of financial stress transmission to Russian financial markets. This forced domestic banks to reduce lending (Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2010 foreign assets as risk-free (and extremely profitable during the depreciation period) investments was replaced with purchases of government securities (treasury notes and CBR bonds). Interestingly, demand of banks for corporate bonds also increased somewhat (Fungáčová and Kurronen, 2009 ).
Increased bank lending was not observed until 2010Q2. clear whether the observed drop of loans growth rates was actually inconsistent with other macroeconomic indicators − the Russian economy was, after all, in the midst of a severe recession. It is also unclear if monetary tightening was the main cause of these developments and, accordingly, the extent to which bank lending could be stimulated by providing more liquidity. In the next sections, we address these questions using a formal model. Figure 4 Loans to NFC and households (contributions to annual growth rates, %)
Model specification and data issues
The empirical literature offers several approaches to modeling lending trends. Perhaps the most conventional is simply to estimate the loan demand function based on the relationship between loans and macroeconomic fundamentals (e.g. GDP and interest rates). The results of such an exercise in the Russian context (CBR, 2010) show lending trends to be generally in line with the fundamentals, i.e. actual loan growth does not deviate substantially from the estimated path. Such results, however, fail to distinguish whether the lending trend is purely demand driven or that the loan supply shocks simply coincide with (or cause) the recession. To tease out better insights, we need a method for disentangling loan supply and demand effects. One potential approach is to rely on microeconomic bank-level data in analyzing the impact of financial crisis on loan supply (e.g. Calani et al., 2010); Del Giovane et al., 2010) . While promising, this approach is hard to apply given the lack of appropriate data for Russian banks (particularly with regard to credit conditions surveys). Identification of a loan supply shock on the basis of available aggregate data may be also attempted.
De Mello and Pisu (2010) estimate six variables VECM for two cointegrating relationships, representing separate loan demand and loan supply equations for Brazil. This approach is replicated by Yudaeva et al. (2009) for Russia, who find that in 2009 actual loans were significantly higher than the equilibrium level implied by loans demand relationship, but lower than implied by loan supply relationship.
An obvious caveat is that large VECM models are data intense, and here we must deal with a fairly short time series of Russian data. To overcome this, we assume that Bayesian estimation is more appropriate then canonical econometrics. We will also apply an agnostic identification scheme by imposing sign restrictions on the impulse response functions. Although somewhat subjective, this approach allows us to disentangle different types of shocks using the data in a very parsimonious way.
Our empirical strategy is closely related to the method proposed by Busch et al. (2010) , which can be briefly summarized as follows. Consider the conventional reduced-form VAR
where Y t is an n x 1 vector of time series; B(L) is a matrix polynomial in the lag operator L; u t is an n x 1 vector of residuals with variance-covariance matrix E[u t u′ t ]=Σ. This model is estimated using a Normal-Wishart distribution prior for (B,Σ) as in Uhlig (2005) .
To decompose u t and obtain economically meaningful structural innovations, we need to find a matrix A such that Ae t = u t , where e t an n x 1 vector of structural innovations assumed to be independent so that E[e t e′ t ]=I n . The only restriction on A is
We need at least n x (n-1)/2 restrictions on A to achieve identification. We therefore restrict A to be a lower triangular as implied by Cholesky decomposition. For any orthogonal matrix Q with QQ′= In, Σ= AQQ′A′ is an admissible decomposition for Σ. As we cannot discriminate among different Q-matrices from the data, we select only those data that fulfill the a priori imposed restrictions on impulse responses. For that purpose, we first draw n times from the posterior distributions of (B,Σ) and obtain n models. We then randomly select one from these and start combining it with randomly (as proposed in (Hülsewig et al., 2004) . At the same time, when the deposits trend may be considered with certainty as exogenous, this indicator is appropriate for the purpose of loan supply modeling (for examples, see Khwaja and Mian, 2008; Paravisini, 2008; and Imai and Takarabe, 2009) . Given that the CBR's forex purchases and fiscal policy measures have direct effect on money stock in Russia, we see the supposition of exogeneity as plausible. Indeed, the choice of money stock as a monetary policy stance variable for modeling bank lending is quite common for the economies with managed exchange-rate regime even at aggregate level (e.g. Sun et al., 2010) . We thus choose the stock of ruble bank deposits as the monetary stance variable for our model.
We believe that using the indicator of deposits may be superior to other money measures (i.e. broad money or monetary base) as the composition of monetary aggregates was unstable during the observation period. Specifically, the use of the deposits variable allows us to not only capture the gradual replacement of cash holdings by bank deposits that occurred in Russia at that time but also the episodes of massive withdrawing of deposits such as during the 2004 "crisis of confidence." We also cross-check our results from the benchmark model against those obtained using alternative monetary stance variables (monetary base and overnight interest rate).
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We generally follow Busch et al. (2010) with regard to imposing sign restrictions on impulse response functions (Table 2) . By design, both expansionary loan supply and monetary stance shocks are reflected by a decrease in interest rates and increases in lending, GDP and price levels. We identify monetary stance shocks as those preceded by deposit increases. Unlike Busch et al. (2010) , who require a tightening of the monetary stance in response to an expansionary loan supply shock, we do not do that here as we lack adequate evidence to believe that CBR monetary policies were based on such an assumption during the reviewed period. Thus, we simply leave the monetary stance variable's reaction unrestricted in the case of a loan supply shock. We estimate the model on our time sample for 1999Q1−2010Q4. While including crisis observations into the sample may cloud the results, estimating the model with the relatively short pre-crisis data series would limit us to analyzing only the favorable side of the economic cycle. Adding observations from the recession period seem reasonable in our pursuit of adequate results. Moreover, the imposed theoretically founded sign restrictions are validated on the full time sample; they are not supported by the pre-crisis time sample (see Annex II).
Except for interest rate, all variables are in logs and seasonally adjusted with X-12. Quarterly data are used. We set the lag length to 3 as adding further lags would cause the instability of 1 The results obtained using the model with monetary base are reported in Annex III. The model with the short-term interest rate did not produce adequate results, affirming our choice of the money stock variables instead of interest rates. 2 We use the term "monetary stance shock" rather than "monetary policy shock." Given how CBR monetary policy was implemented in the period, our monetary stance variable takes in factors beyond the CBR's defined decision-making scope (such as capital flows and fiscal policy setting).
the model and growing oscillation in the impulse responses. We set the number of initially drawn sets of VAR parameters to n = 1000, the number of attempts made to find the appropriate Q-matrix before the model is discarded to p = 1000 and the number of accepted models to m = 5000. Remarkably, the results show convergence at this level; increasing these parameters further does not change the outcome significantly.
Results
We commence by estimating the median impulse responses, along with the 16% and 84% quantiles, to loan supply and monetary stance shocks that conform to the imposed sign restrictions. The resulting impulse responses (Figs. 5 and 6) for each type look quite similar. Both loan supply and monetary stance shocks cause the positive impact on GDP, GDP deflator and loans, as well as a persisting negative impact on the interest rate (particularly in case of monetary stance shock) that lasts noticeably longer than the sign restrictions require. The impact of the shocks upon the loans peaks after about 6 quarters, signifying prolonged transmission. IN contrast, the impact on other variables starts to die out after the 2 or 3 quarters. The reaction of these variables is largely determined by the sign restrictions, so it is hardly surprising that both loan supply and monetary stance shock are similar in terms of GDP, prices, loans and interest rates responses. The impact of loan supply shock on deposits is unrestricted, however, and could thus be the main distinction between the two shocks.
Notably, we find that both types of shocks are associated with the increase of deposits (although more pronounced in case of monetary stance shock). While this is by definition in the case of monetary stance shock, this could be due to the direct effect of lending growth on money stock growth in case of the loan supply shock.
This result may make it harder to distinguish between the two types of shocks. Interestingly, there is no such effect when the monetary base is used as a monetary stance variable (see Annex III). This seems theoretically plausible; an expansion of lending only directly influences the money stock, not the monetary base. II-00  IV-00  II-01  IV-01  II-02  IV-02  II-03  IV-03  II-04  IV-04  II-05  IV-05  II-06  IV-06  II-07  IV-07  II-08  IV-08  II-09  IV-09 II-10 IV-10
Figure 8 Identified monetary stance shock innovations
As shown in Busch et al. (2010) , the deviations of loans from the baseline projection of the model may be decomposed into the cumulated sum of the identified structural shocks. We present this historical decomposition (Fig. 9) to get an insight into the drivers behind lending trends.
While the comovement of shocks may indicate insufficient distinction of the two types, our results seem generally plausible and are confirmed by the estimates of the alternative model (Annex III). The decomposition shows that the impact from the monetary stance shocks is positive in the period preceding the crisis and reaches its peak at the beginning of 2008. Following the contractionary monetary stance shock, the impact turns negative in 2009. Recalling the prolonged transmission length, we expect the impact to remain negative for some time. This finding contrasts with the results of Busch et al. (2010) , who, based on German data, suggest the monetary policy shocks were essentially neutral during the crisis. As explanation, we again note that Russia's monetary stance in this period was not determined exclusively by the CBR. III-00  II-01  I-02  IV-III-03  II-04  I-05  IV-III-06  II-07  I-08  IV-III- Here, we check whether the imposed sign restrictions on impulse response functions are supported or contradicted by the data. This is quite relevant as our empirical strategy implies shuffling not only through the structural shocks identification matrices but also through the VAR coefficients.
We propose a couple simple exercises to gain insight into the extent the imposed sign restrictions are validated by the observed data. We report the results for estimates on the full time sample (1999Q1−2010Q4) and on the pre-crisis time sample (1999Q1−2008Q2).
Following Chadha et al. (2008) , one criterion could be the percentage of accepted draws out of total draws needed to accept 5,000 conforming models. The suggested benchmark is 15%.
Our results stand at:
Full time sample -99.9% (5,000 out of 5,004)
Pre-crisis time sample -3.5% (5,000 out of 142,207)
The results indicate our suggested sign restrictions are valid. However, estimating the VAR-model only on the pre-crisis time sample drastically decreases the chances of obtaining results conforming to the sign restrictions.
We now move to a few formal tests to analyze whether the distribution of VAR parameters of 5,000 accepted models (B_acc) deviate significantly from the distribution of parameters of initially drawn 1,000 models (B). We perform the tests for each of 80 individual VAR parameters, as well as for the aggregate distribution of all standardized parameters. are the standard deviation of two distributions, n =1000 and m =5000 are the distribu-tion sizes. We use the quantiles of normal distribution (0,1) to test the hypothesis, which is acceptable for large samples.
Second, we test for the homogeneity of distributions using the Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon rank test (Mann and Whitney, 1947) . This test implies the hypothesis H 0 : Р(B i < B_acc i ) = 1/2 and the following test statistic:
for large n and m.
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